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Abstract
At a time when fossil fuel burning, nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and other retrograde steps are being 
promoted, the prospects for world peace and environmental systems stability may appear dim. Exactly because of this is it 
the more important to continue to examine the sources of conflict. A major obstacle to general progress is the currently 
dominant economic practice and theory, which is here called the economy-as-usual, or economics-as-usual, as appropriate. 
A special obstacle to constructive change is the language in which economic matters are usually discussed. This language 
is narrow, conservative, technical and often obscure. The rapid changes in the environment (physical and living) are largely 
kept in a separate compartment. If, however, the partition is removed, economics-as-usual, with its dependence on growth 
and its widening inequality, is seen to be unsustainable. Radical economic change, for better or worse, is to be expected. 
Such change is here called economy change. The change could be for the better if it involved an expansion of the concept of 
economics itself, along the lines of oikonomia, a modern revival of a classical Greek term for management or household. 
In such an expanded view, not everything of economic value can be measured. It is argued that economics-as-usual is the 
source of much strife. Some features are indicated of a less conflictual economy—more just, cooperative and peaceful. These 
features include a dignified life available to all people as of right, the word ‘wealth’ being reconnected with weal, well and 
well-being, and ‘work’ being understood as including all useful activity.
Keywords Economic change · Economy change · Economy-as-usual · Oikonomia · Stability · Conflict · Peace
1 Introduction
When, in the context of ‘world peace and environmental 
systems stability’, the terms ‘global’, ‘globalisation’, and 
‘local’ are used, it is clear that they refer to spatial extent 
and the spatial scales, in context, are reasonably clear. There 
is, of course, another relevant dimension, namely time, and 
the inclusion of ‘stability’ indicates this. ‘Peace’ also gener-
ally suggests a degree of stability. It has often enough been 
remarked that a world in which perfect peace reigned world-
wide and in which global environmental systems were highly 
stable would be boring. Even Kant (1795), a philosopher not 
noted for a humorous approach, opens his essay Perpetual 
Peace (p 3) by making a comparison with a graveyard. In 
the present times, however, it is important to examine and 
continually re-examine the sources of human conflict and 
destructiveness.
In this complex web of concern, one problem has received 
insufficient notice and is a sticking point that impedes gen-
eral progress. This obstacle is public economic discourse, 
that is, the language in which economic matters are defined 
and publicly presented by economists, bankers, politicians, 
administrators, business leaders and the mass media. The 
language shapes a public consensus about what is normal 
and practical. The present paper challenges that consen-
sus and proposes a distinction between economic change 
(minor quantitative changes within an economy-as-usual) 
and economy change (a radical change, of whatever kind, 
to a completely different economy). In particular, reconnec-
tion of the term economy with its Greek root—oikonomia, 
meaning management or household—is advocated. With 
such an expanded usage, important contributions which are 
not counted in the usual economy, such as unpaid work, 
are included. In view of the rapid changes underway in the 
physical and living environment, economy change is to be 
expected, and indeed on a short timescale, possibly very 
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short and surely no more than a few decades. And if econ-
omy change, of some kind, is to be expected, it makes sense 
to try to make it positive, rather than, as is all too common 
at present, to deny it or to deny that humans can choose.
The economic structure of a society, and of societies with 
which it interacts, is a major factor influencing the manner 
in which conflicts of interest play out. This paper avoids 
advocating any blueprint for an economy-as-a-whole or 
for world peace. It does, however, propose that respect for 
the physical and living environment, justice, cooperation, 
and restraint are values that would promote a more peace-
ful world, in which conflicts of interest were acknowledged 
realistically and resolved in a proportionate manner. Several 
features that could contribute to a peaceful oikonomia are 
described briefly—the necessities for a dignified life avail-
able to all people as of right; wealth recapturing its meaning 
surrounding such words as commonweal, etc; work defined 
so as to include all useful activity; limits to the accumula-
tion of property.
2  Systems, change and stability
In the present context, system is taken in general to mean 
an organised body of material or immaterial things. The 
particular systems of interest are cultural systems, ecologi-
cal systems and those physical systems, such as the global 
climate, whose impact on cultural and ecological systems is 
problematic and urgent. In the cultural category, economic 
systems will be of concern, with special attention to the stark 
separation between quantitative economic models and the 
practise of political economy. All of the systems of interest 
change with time and the range of timescales is very great. 
The speed and extent of change affects what is considered 
(there being no objective criterion) to be stable or unstable.
2.1  Economy‑as‑usual as a system
The currently dominant economy, an economic system, 
is here dubbed economy-as-usual; and the corresponding 
practise of study and application is economics-as-usual. 
They have widely recognised characteristics—notably 
individualism, market orientation, emphasis on supply 
and demand, weak regulation, rapid growth and increasing 
inequality. One may consider this system to have reached a 
kind theoretical completion about two-thirds of a century 
ago—see for example Feser (2006) on Friedrich Hayek 
and Butler (1985) on Milton Friedman—and to have 
achieved practical political hegemony about one-third 
of a century ago with the assumption of political power 
in 1979 in the UK by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
and in 1980 in the USA by President Ronald Reagan. 
Established terms cognate with economics-as-usual are 
neoliberal economics, neoclassical economics and capital-
ism. These terms are used with numerous nuances by many 
authors, for example, respectively, pp 52–61 of Lanchester 
(2014); Earle, Moran and Ward-Perkins (2017); Schutz 
(1999). The present paper will not be concerned with the 
differences between the numerous schools of thought in 
economics—see, for example, Barnett 2015, pp 25–85 of 
Costanza et al. (2015); pp 77–85 of Foldvary (2015); pp 
35–116 of Scott Cato (2011). Instead, it will focus on the 
near-universal features of the currently dominant system, 
its unsustainability, and how it may change. The cur-
rent system is so much taken for granted as to be tacitly 
assumed by many to define economics and ‘the economy’. 
This system plays a large part in cultural discourse as a 
whole despite the very concept of ‘the economy’ being a 
modern development (pp 14–15 of Earle et al. 2017).
A notable feature of economics-as-usual, considered as 
a system, is that it falls into two weakly interacting parts. 
One is the set of mathematical models learned, taught 
and used by professional economists. The narrow focus 
on these models by the professionals is subject to intense 
criticism, especially but not exclusively since economists’ 
failure to forestall or anticipate the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis. An important group of the critics comprises eco-
nomics students and recent graduates around the world. 
They mount informed arguments for broadening econom-
ics degree curricula which are focused almost exclusively 
on mathematical models and neglect the teaching even of 
classical economics (Earle et al. 2017).
The other part of economics-as-usual comprises the 
learning, teaching and practise of political economy. Here, 
‘practise’ refers to the choices made by those with a train-
ing in this subject who hold highly influential positions in 
government (including administration), business and the 
media (Beckett 2017). There is a stark division of labour 
between this power elite and mathematical economists. 
The former rarely understand the mathematical models, 
which are indeed complex, and the latter develop and 
apply the models in a blinkered way. Consequently, the 
two parts of economics-as-usual, political economy and 
mathematical modelling, are only weakly coupled.
It is not suggested here that mathematical models have 
no valid place in economics. On the contrary, such models 
have an important place in the totality of economics but 
the models, their limitations and their results, should be 
presented as clearly as possible. Petit (1990) is an example 
of a technical exposition without obfuscation or unneces-
sary jargon. Further, it should be made more clear what 
parts of a broader concept of ‘the economy’ have been left 
out of quantitative analyses and plans. A large amount of 
this broader material is discussed clearly in, for example, 
Boyle and Simms 2009; Costanza 2015; Jackson 2012; 
Scott Cato 2011.
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2.2  Change
All systems of interest to this paper (environmental, ecologi-
cal, economic, political) change with time and the range of 
relevant timescales is enormous, from geological time for 
the slower evolutionary developments, through minutes for 
launch-on-warning nuclear weapon systems, to tiny fractions 
of a second for automatic global trading. Sometimes, how-
ever, economic change is relatively slow or modest. A recent 
example is the (perceived) Great Moderation. A notable ref-
erence to this was made by Ben Bernanke (2004), Chairman 
of the US Federal Reserve, who claimed that over the previ-
ous 20 years or so there had been a substantial decline in 
macroeconomic volatility. Evidently, Bernanke did not fore-
see the ‘volatility’ of 2007–2008, later given various labels, 
such as credit crunch, sub-prime mortgage crisis, and finan-
cial crisis of 2007–2008. In that case, as with many others 
historically, a build-up of stress is unrecognised. A period of 
growth leads to unwarranted enthusiasm and suspension of 
critical judgement (Terzi 1999) followed by a crash.
Another mode of change, between slow and sudden, is 
represented in the phrase rapid change, which has become 
widely used, especially in climate science (for example, Sei-
dov et al. 2001). Gradual change (the meaning of this being 
understood in some context) can be adapted to relatively 
easily, whereas rapid change causes excessive disruption. 
This language reflects the recognition that, in the kind of 
problems considered here, everything does change, so that 
stability is not stasis. Nor, in complex living or cultural sys-
tems is stability as precisely defined as in various fields of 
mathematics and engineering. Rather, between stability and 
instability there is a grey region which is the limit of what 
is tolerable.
In the early stages of the industrial revolution, change 
was, in the sense indicated, rapid. There was a brutal disrup-
tion of communities whose way of life was undermined by 
the new technologies—ingenious mechanisms, steam power, 
the factory system (Fielden 1969). Those early stages were 
followed by a period of adaptation and reform (Henriques 
1971), during which change, while not slow, was more con-
sidered than in the earlier period.
In a similar way, the period since about 1970 may be 
considered to be the early ‘wild west’ stage of other rapid 
changes. One may think of information technology (IT), or 
of neo-liberal economics. It is here suggested that these two 
are connected. IT provided extended scope for very rapid 
investment analysis and trading, and that drove the trend 
of deregulation of banking and of stock markets. Further, 
the great opportunities opened up for those able to move 
quickly into the new economic space provide a motive for 
creating and establishing economic language that makes the 
new developments appear necessary. That language presents 
the avoidance of an economic instability (general market 
failure) as a fundamental task in the management of civi-
lised society. In this way a general conservatism (preserva-
tion of economics-as-usual) is normalised. In the remaining 
sections of this paper, this mind-set will be criticised and 
the need for a major expansion of economic thinking dem-
onstrated, if the conflict that is currently evident in human 
society is not to get completely out of hand.
2.3  Stability
This subsection is primarily about how stability is viewed in 
economics-as-usual and how planetary limits to growth are 
largely ignored in the discourse of economics-as-usual. As 
indicated earlier, there is in economics no objective criterion 
for stability. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact 
that essentially the same period that Bernanke (2004) and 
others call the Great Moderation (of market volatility) was 
referred to by Arner (2007) as a series of financial crises. 
The Introduction to his book opens “why do financial cri-
ses occur and what can be done to prevent such crises and 
reduce their impact when they do occur? Today, following 
a series of financial crises around the world over the past 
15 years, this question has to some extent been answered”.
Arner’s timing was even more unfortunate than Bernan-
ke’s, the introduction being dated January 2007. (The begin-
ning of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, from which much 
else followed, is given by Elliott (2011) as August 2007.) 
Another optimistic pronouncement relating to stability was 
made by Robert Lucas (2003) at the opening of his Presiden-
tial Address to the American Economics Association, who 
said of macroeconomics “Its central problem of depression-
prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and 
has in fact been solved for many decades.” It is true that the 
mistaken initial responses to the Great Depression were not 
repeated in 2007 or the next few years. Nevertheless, this 
quotation gives a sense of missing something.
Several decades ago, Hyman Minsky proposed (pp 
173–175 of Minsky 1986) that capitalism is inherently 
prone to financial instability. The FIH (financial instabil-
ity hypothesis) did not gain much support from orthodox 
economists until the economic events of 2007 and 2008. 
Even then, the environmental and ecological limitations did 
not become salient. There is a chasm between economics-
as-usual discourse on stability and the discourse found in 
environment and ecology oriented studies. One indication 
of the frustration induced in scholars deeply concerned with 
the global predicament appears almost at the end (p 210) of 
‘an environmental history of the Anthropocene since 1945’, 
when the authors (McNeill and Engelke 2014) break from 
their normal magisterial tone to declare that economists have 
“jilted reality in favour of a different fantasy, one of ever-
more-abstract modelling based on universalizing assump-
tions of individual behaviour and state conduct, casually 
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
ripped from all historical and cultural, not to mention eco-
logical, context.”
3  Environmental system stability
In Something New Under the Sun, John McNeill (2000) pre-
sents ‘an environmental history of the twentieth century’ 
(the book’s subtitle) which has stood the test of the 17 years 
to date and is recognised as a classic work. It is, for exam-
ple, frequently cited in The State of the World 2015 (The 
Worldwatch Institute 2015), a report that shows that human 
impact on the global environment has a systemic character 
(individual components cannot be understood in isolation) 
and is at risk of producing severe instability.
Global environmental system stability is a matter of great 
concern in many interconnected subsystems where dan-
gerously rapid large-scale changes are in progress. These 
changes include falling water tables (pp 21–33 of Brown 
2011); tropical deforestation (Fearnside 2015); soil loss 
(pp 34–44 of Brown 2011); ocean acidification (Gatusso 
and Hansson 2011); increase of human population (United 
Nations Population Fund 2016); global warming (Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change 2017); biodiversity 
redistribution (Pecl, Araújo, Bell et al. 2017).
Renner (2015) points out that “Environmental change 
takes place not in linear, predictable ways that can be studied 
in isolation from other factors, but rather entails unexpected 
discontinuities, synergisms, feedback loops, and cascading 
effects.” An alarming but not unrealistic type of cascading 
effect, not mentioned much by political, administrative and 
business elites, or even by the media and the public, per-
haps because it is very alarming, is the ‘perfect storm’ of 
Beddington (2009) whose Abstract declares “It is predicted 
that by 2030 the world will need to produce 50 per cent 
more food and energy, together with 30 per cent more avail-
able fresh water, whilst mitigating and adapting to climate 
change. This threatens to create a ‘perfect storm’ of global 
events.” Arguably, these interlocked problems are becom-
ing to manifest already. One such sign comprises horrific 
developments on the humanitarian front, as reported by the 
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to 
the Security Council on Missions to Yemen, South Sudan, 
Somalia and Kenya (O’Brien 2017).
Moreover, human culture is not rising to the numerous 
challenges with the necessary clarity. Instead, the response 
is too often denial and obfuscation of the real source of prob-
lems—by, for example, the head of the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (Mooney et al. 2016). Speaking of carbon 
dioxide to the US business news channel CNBC on 9 March 
2017, he said “I would not agree that it’s a primary contribu-
tor to the global warming that we see” (Milman 2017).
This kind of denial and obfuscation appears to be a pre-
sent day vindication of the subtitle of Jared Diamond’s 
(2005) study Collapse: how societies choose to fail or sur-
vive. (The first, US, edition has the subtitle how societies 
choose to fail or succeed.) The book was a major popular 
bestseller but its title, subtitles and content have provoked 
intense controversy from specialists in many fields. Notable 
among the many criticisms is Questioning Collapse: human 
resilience, ecological vulnerability, and the aftermath of 
empire (McAnany and Yoffee 2010), a collection of articles 
by anthropologists, archaeologists and historians. Diamond 
(2010), in turn, has criticised those authors’ claims in a book 
review. In a multi-faceted controversy, reflecting Diamond’s 
broad sweep of societies in place and time, the points of 
interest for the present paper concern the cultural, psycho-
logical and linguistic differences between two attitudes to 
(the contested) current global environmental system stabil-
ity. One of these attitudes focuses on ‘human resilience’, 
the other on collapse or at least on catastrophe. This paper 
is not concerned with the many disputes of anthropological, 
archaeological and historical fact and interpretation between 
Diamond’s Collapse and the collection Questioning Col-
lapse, important as it is of course to avoid errors, even of 
detail. Without going so far as to pin the labels environ-
mental determinism or geographical determinism, which are 
indeed strong terms, it can be said that Collapse emphasises 
environmental factors as the key to understanding the con-
tinuation or demise of large, complex societies. Further, in 
Collapse, the demise is often complete, or almost so. In the 
multi-author counterblast Questioning Collapse, historical, 
cultural, political and economic factors are emphasised. It 
is also maintained that collapse and almost total disappear-
ance (as expressed so graphically in Shelley’s 1817 poem 
Ozymandias, reprinted on p vii of Collapse) is much less 
common than Diamond suggests. A variety of cultures does 
persist, adapt or assimilate, as indicated by ‘human resil-
ience’ in the subtitle of Questioning Collapse.
Whether or not Diamond’s attempt to understand how 
earlier societies ‘choose’ to ‘fail’ or ‘succeed/survive’ was 
valid, the importance of global environmental system sta-
bility is undeniable—for those aware of current knowledge 
of the Anthropocene. The suggestion that the global envi-
ronmental changes merited the naming of a new geological 
epoch, taking over from the Holocene at the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution, was proposed by Crutzen (2002). 
In this article, he mentions several precursor ideas, going 
back as far as 1864 (Marsh 2014). A concise overview of 
the evidence for the Anthropocene proposition may be found 
in Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill (2007)—at the beginning 
of their abstract (p 614), they describe the Anthropocene as 
“the current epoch in which humans and our societies have 
become a global geophysical force.”
AI & SOCIETY 
1 3
As if this were not enough, the rate of increase of many 
measures of human influence has itself increased markedly 
since the end of World War II. The term The Great Accelera-
tion has been coined for this. Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill 
devote a section (pp 617–618) to this. See especially their 
Figure 2 which displays the acceleration of 12 important 
growth indicators. The argument for The Great Acceleration 
has been set out in more detail in a book with that title by 
McNeill and Engelke (2014).
The present paper is not concerned with disputes about 
whether The Anthropocene is technically acceptable to 
geologists as a new epoch and, if so, when it should start; 
nor with details of The Great Acceleration such as should 
its beginning be 1945 or around 1950. The focus here is on 
‘undeniable’. On the one hand, the scientific evidence and 
general consensus is strong for a large, rapid and acceler-
ating climate change (World Meteorological Organization 
2017). Yet exactly what seems undeniable to virtually all 
who have studied the subject is denied by powerful actors, 
notably US President Trump (Parker and Davenport 2016), 
his senior appointees (Milman 2017) and a powerful fossil 
fuel lobby (Dunlap 2013). Many influential economists, also, 
while few are outright deniers, appear to avoid a meaning-
ful engagement with the current precarious state of global 
environmental system stability. For a comment on one aspect 
of this, see Lawlor (2016).
The scale and speed of current environmental changes is 
made possible by technology but humanity does not have 
to use the available powers so aggressively or recklessly. 
There are two major aspects of the unwise use of technol-
ogy—growth and inequality. Both are economic phenomena 
and both, if unbridled, lead to conflict. The next section will 
discuss economy-as-usual versus economy change. The final 
section will discuss the generation of conflict by economy-
as-usual and ways in which economy change could contrib-
ute to reducing the generation of conflict and to managing 
such residual conflicts as do arise.
4  Economy‑as‑usual versus economy 
change
The economic system that has dominated the world for 
nearly half a century is here called the economy-as-usual 
or, as appropriate, economics-as-usual. It has been highly 
successful—on its own terms. Two key tenets are that eco-
nomic growth is vital and that the essential characteristics of 
the economy, including growth, can be measured. For many, 
the economy-as-usual has become more-or-less a world-
view (see, for example, the critique of Earle et al. 2017). 
Economics-as-usual has delivered enormous increases in 
the ‘standard of living’ (as measured by its own methods) 
of very many people—a result which is a significant part of 
the explanation of its world-wide dominance. Besides real 
benefits there are, however, important drawbacks to those 
economic conditions, which are seen clearly through an 
economic lens with a broader field, oikonomia. Unsatisfy-
ing consumption, restlessness, loneliness and mistrust can-
not be measured but they are significant indictments of life 
under the economy-as-usual. Three other three problematic 
aspects—growth, technology and inequality—are discussed 
briefly in the following subsections.
4.1  Growth
According to economics-as-usual, growth has been sustained 
(occasional drops, while alarming at the time, are quickly 
corrected by methods known to economic science) and ben-
eficial. The publication of The Limits to Growth (Meadows 
et al. 1972) drew a passionately hostile response from econ-
omists, for example from Wilfred Beckerman, who in his 
professorial inaugural lecture (p 331 of Beckerman 1972) 
declared that Limits “attempts to blind the reader with sci-
ence in the form of a pretentious array of computer print-
out diagrams and equations”. Controversy about Limits has 
continued through the decades; pp 3–18 of AtKisson (2011) 
gives a survey. Especially in and since the 1970s, there has 
been a strong polarisation between most professional econo-
mists, who are dominant in business, government and edu-
cation, and their critics. The first group maintains a firm 
commitment to growth of the kind pursued so far in the 
economics-as-usual period. There is, however, as indicated 
in Sect. 3, Environmental System Stability, strong evidence 
that planetary limits have been reached or at least are near. 
Despite this, early concerns appear to have dissipated rather 
than intensified. Renner (2015) writes, on p 5, “The 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro was a milestone in global 
environmental consciousness. Yet in the two decades since 
then, the pressures on the planet’s natural resources and 
ecological systems have only increased, and the second Rio 
conference—“Rio + 20” in 2012—was far less of an envi-
ronmental milestone.”
Renner backs this up with a table (1.2, p 10) showing 18 
indicators of growth in that 20-year period, all but one of 
which show increase, ranging from 13 to 311%. The single 
exception—a 93% decrease in use of ozone-depleting sub-
stances—is however significant, for it shows what is possible 
in cases when a technical solution (substitution) is available 
and political will exists. Those conditions were evidently not 
usually present during 1992–2012.
4.2  Technology
Against the extreme nature of prolonged exponential 
growth, faith is placed by economics-as-usual in technical 
efficiency. Yet in general growth has exceeded technical 
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efficiency gains in the economy-as-usual era. This is the 
nature of the economy-as-usual, which requires ever-
expanding markets (Foster 2000). The ‘paradox’ that an 
improvement in the efficiency of processing a resource 
may lead to an increase, not a decrease, in the use of that 
resource was noted already by William Stanley Jevons 
(1865) who observed (for example at p 112) that more 
efficient steam engines led to a greatly increased consump-
tion of coal.
Under the conditions of economy-as-usual there are many 
examples of Jevons’ paradox. One such is the increase in the 
use of paper in the computer age, contrary to much early talk 
of the paperless office. Sellen and Harper (2002), estimating 
(pp 11–12) office paper consumption, write “for worldwide 
consumption, the trend is a steady steep increase”, a dou-
bling between 1980 and 1997. More recently, the increase is 
slower but still rapid. Bajpai (2015) reports (p 2) “Globally 
paper use has grown an average 1.7% each year over the 
past decade.”
Another example (Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2016) 
is the increasing use of petroleum by the US transportation 
sector. Table 1.12 of that reference includes data on ‘Petro-
leum Production and Transportation Petroleum Consump-
tion in Context, 1950–2015’. There is a steady (faster at first) 
rise throughout the period, from 3.36 million barrels/day in 
1950 to 13.58 mb/d in 2015. The only exceptions are small 
dips in 1973–1974 (OPEC oil embargo), 1979 (second oil 
shock) and 2009–2012 (result of 2007–2008 global finan-
cial crisis). The long-standing US programme ‘Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy’, which was “enacted by Congress 
in 1975, CAFE’s purpose is to reduce energy consumption 
by increasing the fuel economy of cars and light trucks” 
(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2017), has 
produced no discernible reduction in petroleum consump-
tion. Steps to avoid any real reduction have included success-
ful marketing in favour of Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) 
which circumvented the fuel economy requirements (Brad-
sher 2002). In addition, the official fuel economy reports that 
became mandatory in many countries have for many years 
been falsified to a remarkable extent—"The gap between 
the fuel economy you get in the real world and the official 
figures that car manufacturers must quote in their brochures 
has been getting wider and wider. Back in 2001 the average 
gap was a relatively small 8% but by 2014 this had grown to 
40%.” (The AA 2017).
A further unresolved issue with reliance on technological 
solutions within the economy-as-usual is that it reduces the 
need for human labour. This ought to be good. Did it not 
present a wonderful opportunity to transfer a large part of 
heavy and tedious kinds of labour to mechanical devices, 
computers and combinations thereof (robots and cyber-phys-
ical systems)? This has indeed been done, but in a manner 
that has removed stress neither from those in employment 
nor from those who are unemployed and at risk of being 
stigmatised as skivers.
4.3  Inequality
In general, economic inequality fell during the first two-
thirds of the last century but then started to rise and in recent 
decades is rising spectacularly (Dorling 2014; Drèze and Sen 
2013). There is a strong polarisation into winners and los-
ers. The recent political discourse (see, for example, Smith 
2017) about ‘rust belts’ and ‘left-behind’ people is the cur-
rent expression of a half-century trend. The separation of 
the rich behind walls and private green belts, the ‘squeez-
ing’ of the middle class (Ho 2016) and the frustration of the 
humiliated poor (Laverty and Loach 2016) all contribute to 
conflict.
Extreme inequality is not confined to the richest nations, 
nor to the West. Forbes Staff (2017) report that in Malaysia, 
with a population of 31 millions, 12 billionaires have a com-
bined ‘net worth’ equal to 15% of the country’s GDP. And in 
Nepal, with a population of 29 millions, a single billionaire 
has a net worth equal to 6% of the country’s GDP.
4.4  The need for economy change
In a rapidly changing world, economics naturally changes as 
well. The expression used in this paper, economy-as-usual, 
implies that, in popular and orthodox discourses, radical 
economic change (economy change) is ‘off limits’ but it does 
not mean that economics has been static during the last few 
decades. Deregulation, privatisation, growth, increasing role 
of finance, new technology and inequality are all changing 
aspects of the economy-as-usual. The language of econom-
ics also develops, but in a particular and limited way. It has 
become highly technical, not merely as used among profes-
sionals but also between other actors—political, administra-
tive and business leaders. And a remarkable amount of this 
technical language is transmitted to the public by the mass 
media (Gingell 2015).
An important but insufficiently noticed feature of public 
discourse about economics is that it is strongly oriented to 
the quantitative. In this way, a ‘normal’ agenda is set, in 
which the assumptions of economics-as-usual are embedded 
and unexamined. Consequently, even critiques of econom-
ics-as-usual often look for the solution to current problems 
in sustainable growth, or in technology, or in green capital-
ism. The inadequacy of approaches of this kind is argued in, 
for example, Kothari, Demaria and Acosta (2014).
Economists, leaders and the public are always immersed 
in a complicated world. Projects include many components, 
with incommensurable kinds of value. Yet decisions must 
be made and in the end the essence of the quantification 
of economics-as-usual is simplistic, in that it arrives at a 
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one-dimensional concept of value. At this stage, discus-
sions are restricted to the one-dimensional line and the unit 
of measurement on this line is monetary value. Various 
different ‘goods’ exist but their values must somehow be 
quantified and compared by means of exchange rates and so 
brought to points on a common scale. Then, for a given set 
of policy choices, additions and subtractions can be done for 
any number of goods and a single number produced which 
is the net ‘benefit minus cost’. Of many policy choices the 
best one is that with the greatest value of this single number.
Once this utilitarian mind-set is accepted, the use of 
mathematical analysis, within its proper domain, is appro-
priate, although a lot of mystification could and should be 
stripped away. The domain of validity of this approach is 
limited. If there are elements of economic importance that 
cannot be quantified or cannot be quantified adequately, then 
quantitative methods should not be used or at least not used 
by themselves. It is not enough simply to ignore elements 
of economic value that cannot be quantified, whether for 
technical or for societal reasons. Perhaps the most notable 
element omitted in economics-as-usual is the large amount 
of unpaid caring that people do for others and themselves 
(Cottey 2014, pp 23–24 of; Earle et al. 2017). Other ele-
ments that contribute to general well-being include aesthetic 
pleasure, learning, skills, creativity, play and appreciation of 
the natural world (physical and living). These are recognised 
inadequately by economics-as-usual.
Another damaging aspect of the restricted, quantitative 
concept of economic activity is its role in extreme and still 
rising inequality. Defenders of the astronomic incomes and 
assets of the richest argue that super-talented and hard-work-
ing CEOs single-handedly make the difference between suc-
cess and failure of large companies; and likewise that suc-
cessful traders and financiers make the difference between a 
growing global economy (said to be vital) and an economic 
recession (disastrous for all). Rewarding such exceptional 
people with a small fraction of the gigantic differences they 
make is held to be a small price for the stability and growth 
of ‘the economy’.
Such defences of the economy-as-usual have a super-
ficial coherence and are hard to penetrate unless buried 
assumptions which underlie popular economic language are 
revealed. For instance:-
• the terms earnings and income are often conflated
• the current primary meaning of wealth is limited to ‘an 
abundance of valuable possessions or money’. (It could 
usefully be expanded and reconnected with well-being.)
• in economic contexts, the word work is restricted to 
income-generating activity
• striving is now sometimes used to laud an insatia-
ble materialism while people in severe need may be 
denounced as skiving
• in British English, property usually means real estate 
and its wider sense of assets is obscured
• while time is money is too hackneyed a phrase to be 
widely used today, equivalences between time and 
money are embedded in much discourse
• growth of an economics-as-usual kind is tacitly 
assumed to be vital
• technical language distracts from profound injustice 
and suffering
• conservative economic language inhibits vision and 
imagination as to what is possible.
Conventional language makes the economy-as-usual 
seem natural and inevitable. Starting from that place, 
alternative ideas are harder to generate and they seem 
less practical. Yet the growth argument shows that the 
economy-as-usual is unsustainable. Radical change will 
happen, and on a timescale that matters to people living 
today. Rather that wait passively for the economy-as-usual 
to fail in a chaotic manner, it is better to marshal human 
imagination and resourcefulness in consideration of alter-
native economies, appropriate to the new conditions. The 
extremely serious issues of sustainability have led to a 
large literature. Among many valuable contributions are 
Barnett (2015), Boyle and Simms (2009), Costanza et al. 
(2015), Dietz and O’Neill (2013), Gang et al. (2011), Hsu 
(2016), Jackson (2012), Scott Cato (2011).
Radical alternatives to economy-as-usual are sometimes 
said to neglect human nature and human instinct. At stake 
here, as new external conditions press harder, is the man-
ner in which the human response is guided in the short 
term by knowledge and intelligence, in the medium term 
by cultural evolution, and in the long term by biological 
evolution. The purpose of this paper is not to advocate 
a specific oikonomic model, apart from asserting that a 
civilised adaptation is worth working for—something that 
has never been proved impossible, even if the outlook may 
at present be grim. The paper does not construct scenarios. 
Instead, one basic principle is suggested and a few features 
are mentioned which could be major elements of a sustain-
able economy in a jurisdiction. The Basic Principle, to be 
honoured in practice and not merely in name, is all people 
have a right to the basic necessities of a civilised life.
This principle should underpin a jurisdiction’s econ-
omy. Some of the important features of the economy might 
be (Cottey 2014):
• a universal basic income scheme (modest but enough 
to deliver, within the jurisdiction, the basic principle 
according to each person’s needs)
• work defined as any systematic activity useful in creat-
ing and sustaining a good life
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• a share of useful work available to all who desire addi-
tional income
• unnecessary and harmful activity (as, for example, aris-
ing from excessive competition) to be discouraged
• deputation of arduous physical and tedious mental work 
to machines, while encouraging work and play that con-
tribute to healthful physical and mental exercise
• limits, reflecting the person’s circumstances, to personal 
assets and income.
These examples are offered as outlines of some of the 
possibilities opened if radical economy changes (to be 
expected in any case) were guided in a thoughtful, coopera-
tive direction and not in a defensive, selfish direction.
5  Oikonomia and conflict
Human conflict is manifested in a great range of intensi-
ties, from minor interpersonal disagreements to existential 
threats. This last phrase is unfortunately not hyperbole. 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, from its beginning 
in 1945, has never shrunk from study and warning of the 
apocalyptic dangers associated with nuclear arsenals. More 
recently, BAS has added to its concerns a second existen-
tial threat—climate change. As a symbol and a warning, a 
Doomsday Clock, set close to midnight, has for 70 years 
been displayed on the Bulletin’s front cover. The clock has 
been reset only 23 times and in late January of this year 
(2018) the most recent reset was made. The clock now stands 
at two minutes to midnight. Only once before (1953) was 
so dire a reset made. The clock itself is of course simplistic 
and for a full argument one must go to a BAS Statement 
(Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 2018). The reasons for now raising the warning 
level are set out in the Statement. To concerns of a long-
established nature are added (pp 3-5) something new at the 
highest political level—disturbing comments about the use 
and proliferation of nuclear weapons and rejection of the 
overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change.
The Statement is powerful yet one may have a sense of 
something missing. What this is might be deduced from the 
brief biographies of the (19 plus an editor) members of the 
Board. These biographies are very impressive but econom-
ics is hardly represented. Perhaps because of this the State-
ment does not ask what might underlie the noted trends. It 
is a theme of the present paper that economics-as-usual is 
a major source of dangers and that the marginalisation of 
thinking at the level of economy change is a major obstacle 
to the invention, development, testing and deployment of 
prospective solutions.
Before the argument of this paper proceeds further, one 
clarification is needed. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
by virtue of its history and its role, foregrounds apocalyptic 
threats (albeit not exclusively). The worst nuclear weapon 
and climate change scenarios are distinct possibilities and 
they merit attention, no matter how disagreeable such atten-
tion may be. Nevertheless, there is much more to conflict 
than existential threats. This paper attempts to deal with 
human conflicts of all intensities in a unified way. It does 
this by noting that the sources of conflicts are conflicts of 
interest. Further, conflicts of interest are a part of life. There 
is no possibility of a civilisation without conflicts of interest. 
The question is—how to develop civilisation that avoids the 
emergence of the deadliest and most disproportionate quar-
rels and has in place the means for addressing as fairly and 
calmly as possible such conflicts of interest as do occur? It 
was noted in the Introduction that the economic structure of 
a society influences the manner in which conflicts of interest 
play out. The following subsections consider some aspects 
of this.
5.1  Progress?
Human conflict can be divided into three broad classes:
• conflict with the rest of nature (Beddington 2009; Brown 
2011; Costanza et al. 2015; Fearnside 2015; Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change 2017; McNeill 
and Engelke 2014; Parker and Davenport 2016; Renner 
2015; Steffen et al. 2007; The Worldwatch Institute 2015; 
World Meteorological Organization 2017)
• conflict with other humans (Duchrow and Hinkelammert 
2004; Dunlap 2013; Earle et al. 2017; Fielden 1969; Ho 
2016; Laverty and Loach 2016)
• conflict with nature and other humans (O’Brien 2017; 
Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 2017).
It is difficult to maintain morale in the face of the infor-
mation and analysis presented in such sources, frequently 
dealing with atrocious violence, extending even to new 
existential threats. In a much noted book, The Better Angels 
of Our Nature: the decline of violence in history and its 
causes, Steven Pinker (2011) made a lengthy argument for 
its subtitle and thereby for hope that the downward trend 
could be continued. The basic methodological feature that 
permits his startling conclusion is to count violent deaths 
per capita. The probability of a given individual meeting the 
end of their life due to violence from other humans (whether 
murder, judicial execution, or warfare of various kinds) is, 
Pinker maintains, much less now than in earlier times. Today 
is, in relation to our aspirations, a violent and dangerous time 
but earlier times were in some ways much worse.
Pinker’s thesis is well-known to scholars who have stud-
ied the history of violence but is counterintuitive to nearly 
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everyone else, immersed as they are in a continuous flow 
of dramatic—and, let it be admitted, fascinating—stories 
of violence, which are however atypical of human life as 
a whole. True (2014) is an example of many critiques of 
The Better Angels and Pinker (2015) is a response to sev-
eral hostile reviews. The relevance of Pinker’s thesis for the 
present paper is that it does serve as a needed corrective to 
the style of news about the most sensational episodes of con-
flict (as well as violence). On p xxvi of the Preface, Pinker 
writes “The shift is not towards complacency: we enjoy the 
peace we find today because people in past generations were 
appalled by the violence in their time and worked to reduce 
it, and so we should work to reduce the violence that remains 
in our time.”
The question then arises—how should we best work to 
reduce conflict? The proposal of the present paper may be 
expressed thus:
• conflict derives from conflicts of interest
• conflicts of interest can be reduced but not entirely elimi-
nated
• economics-as-usual generates and exacerbates conflicts 
of interest
• economics-as-usual, with its uncritical fixation on con-
ventional growth, is unstable
• economy change, for good or ill, will come
• it is time to open economic discourse to alternatives to 
economics-as-usual.
5.2  Forestalling conflicts
Two aspects of culture which can help to forestall conflicts 
(without prejudice against the importance of other aspects, 
such as the continued development of law, justice, critical 
literacy, tolerance and democracy) will be discussed briefly 
here. They are cooperation and technology.
Concerning cooperation—in the currently dominant 
discourses on social matters of all kinds, individualism 
(in some ways a kind of antithesis of cooperation) is either 
openly in the foreground, or is tacitly assumed to be obvious. 
“If any one term captured that spirit [of the end of the 20th 
century] it was ‘individualism’” (Lukes 2006). For an early 
influential promotion of individualism, see Hayek 1949. For 
a report on the recent and ongoing popularity, among the 
most powerful in the USA, of the extreme individualistic 
philosophy of Ayn Rand, see Freedland 2017.
An important debate about individualism versus coopera-
tion was triggered by the essay The Tragedy of the Commons 
by Garrett Hardin (1968); see also Hardin’s (1998) brief 
Postscript article. As a result of the debate it became more 
widely understood that the tragic progression to over-use 
and eventual ruin applies to unmanaged commons, of which 
the ocean’s fish stocks are a classic example, whereas many 
other commons are managed successfully by the common-
ers (Aligica 2014; Ostrom 1990), so that enclosure (priva-
tisation) is not necessary. The important role of everyday 
cooperation is not newsworthy and is under-reported and 
under-appreciated. The vast majority of human actions, at 
the micro level, are part of an intricate social web. These 
actions rely on past cooperations (the basis of the slow evo-
lution of a society) and on present cooperations (since com-
plex operations cannot otherwise be completed) and they 
also assume future cooperations (so that current plans have 
a chance of realisation). These micro-cooperations play out 
daily, and even minute by minute, in personal life and in 
business. There is no such thing as ‘the’ market, conceptu-
alised as an exogenous ‘invisible hand’. Rather there is an 
immense web of micro-interactions most of which have a 
cooperative nature or at least a cooperative component.
Larger than these micro-cooperative actions are innu-
merable social groups with an ethos of solidarity, such as 
intentional communities (Diggers and Dreamers 2017), 
social clubs, etc. For another example, in the aftermath of 
hurricane Katrina in New Orleans there was, as well as the 
widely reported anti-social behaviour, impressive sponta-
neous solidarity between residents and volunteer outsiders, 
although that was far less reported. This solidarity con-
trasted starkly with the inefficiency and even obstruction of 
the economy-as-usual authorities. All this is described elo-
quently in Chap. 8, ‘Disaster anarchism: hurricane Katrina 
and the shock of recognition’, of the book The Impossible 
Community by John P Clark (2013). Larger again are such 
groups as the Anecoop Group (2016), a ‘coop of coops’ 
with 69 member cooperatives growing and marketing fruit 
and vegetables, and the Mondragon Corporation (no date), 
comprising 261 businesses and cooperatives (Gallego-Bono 
and Chaves-Avila 2016).
An important aspect of forestalling conflict is the rate of 
human reproduction. The transition to a low level of con-
flicts of interest will likely involve a transition to a more 
stable global population, considerably smaller than the cur-
rent 7.5 billion. The word aspect was here chosen advisedly, 
it being considered that the word problem in this context is 
unhelpful. It is not proposed here to suggest what trajecto-
ries the global human population should, could or will take 
in the coming decades and centuries, beyond the general 
observation that a globally cooperative approach is better 
than an individualistic or nationalistic one. In the present 
world situation, the encouragement of population growth 
as a matter of nationalistic or economic policy is especially 
dangerous. Solinger and Nakachi (2015) have edited “a col-
lection of case studies that explore when and how half of the 
twenty most populous countries in the world invented and 
implemented population policies.”
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Concerning technology—the manner in which technical 
efficiency gains are negated in the economy-as-usual is 
discussed in Sect. 4.2. By contrast, in a culture with a radi-
cally different economic ethos—not fixated on growth, not 
worshiping competition and not accepting gross inequal-
ity—technical efficiency gains could be real and substan-
tial. One example is the development of lighting. Solid-
state lighting technology fact sheet: energy efficiency of 
LEDs (US Department of Energy 2013) shows the great 
improvement in longevity and energy efficiency relative to 
the incandescent lighting that was widespread until quite 
recently. It is also, for many applications, a significant 
step forward relative to the various designs of fluorescent 
light. LED lights are, however, still at a ‘middle’ stage 
of development. The section ‘Considerations for use’ of 
Light-emitting diode (Wikipedia 2017) mentions 11 advan-
tages and 11 disadvantages. Further improvements may be 
expected. Finding the best lighting system for each of the 
many uses is a complex matter, depending on cultural pri-
orities. In the economy-as-usual, however, there is no evi-
dence of an overall reduction in energy used for lighting, 
even in rich industrialised countries, where excessive arti-
ficial light levels are widespread. Hanson (2014) reports, 
in a (valid) interpretation of what Tsao and Waide (2010) 
write on p 278 of a long technical article, that “the result 
of increases in luminous efficacy has been an increase in 
demand for energy used for lighting that nearly exactly 
offsets the efficiency gains”.
On the other hand, in an economy radically different from 
the economy-as-usual, that gave high priority to avoiding the 
unnecessary use of energy, substantial lighting efficiency 
gains would permit commensurate energy savings. In such 
an economy, technology is able to contribute in like manner 
to many aspects of life. Thus many improvements in techno-
logical efficiency, along with other changes (developments 
in cooperation, democracy, education, etc), contribute real—
and not merely promised—progress towards sustainability.
The discussion at this point is oriented to breaking free 
from the addiction to growth that is characteristic of econ-
omy-as-usual but there is another aspect of forestalling con-
flicts that must be addressed, namely the gross and increas-
ing inequality in societies worldwide. It is to be noted here 
that the division is not simply between nation-states that are 
rich and powerful, and those that are poor and weak. The 
divisions between rich and poor are complex and manifold. 
They cut across nation-state boundaries and, if they are to be 
understood and addressed, must be viewed in terms of indi-
viduals, communities and cultures. The evolution of a just 
economy, much more egalitarian and much different from 
the economy-as-usual, requires, no doubt, long and arduous 
struggle. It is, however, possible to envision such an econ-
omy as the product of past and future developments in civi-
lisation. This vision can be considered an expansion of the 
ideas of The Better Angels of our Nature (Pinker 2011) from 
reduction of violence to reduction of the causes of conflict.
5.3  Addressing residual conflicts
The current high level of individualism, competition and 
accumulation goes with a harsh attitude to ‘losers’. In 
societies with enough for all, gross inequality (see, for 
example, Drèze and Sen 2013) denies even basic necessi-
ties to many. This is a generalised form of violence, and 
more specific forms of violence, such as violence against 
women, and violent religious strife, can be considered con-
sequences of this general violence. If this is correct, just 
and equitable societies forestall, in the course of time, at 
least a large part of the conflict that exists in oppressive 
societies.
This paper foregrounds a broad concept of conflict, 
beyond the more restricted ideas of war, violence and 
peace. From a humane point of view, wars and abuses of 
numerous kinds are hard to contemplate in a connected and 
effective manner. For many, the news, which selects the 
most dramatic but also intractable stories, induces despair. 
Ultimately, the daily diet desensitises. Pinker (2011) tries 
to restore some hope by noting that violence was much 
worse in the past and that a long historical view shows 
that significant progress has occurred. The argument of the 
present paper, which is primarily about economy change, 
suggests a different ordering of attention. Instead of look-
ing first to war and other forms of horrific violence, it may 
be more effective in the long run to attend to the conflicts 
of interest which generate those abuses. It is sometimes 
argued that abusers are themselves the victims of earlier 
abuse. For example, Leach, Stewart and Smallbone (2016) 
write on p 150 “we found that poly-victimisation was sig-
nificantly associated with sexual offending, violent offend-
ing, and general (non-sexual, non-violent) offending.” This 
may apply to individuals, various minority groups, social 
classes, ethnic groups and to nations. In an oikonomia ori-
ented to justice and moderation, conflicts of interest may 
be expected to be much less than in the current economy-
as-usual, where high levels of individualism, competition 
and inequality can be abusive or lead to abusive behaviour 
(Duchrow and Hinkelammert 2004).
Conflicts of interest will never be wholly removed but 
they could be much less severe than at present and much 
more amenable to the conflict resolution approach. Impor-
tant organisations relating to conflict resolution include the 
Center for Nonviolent Communication (2017) and Peace 
Direct (2017). The methods used by these and other organi-
sations have some impressive achievements even when 
embedded, as they are to date, in the economy-as-usual. If 
just and egalitarian economies gradually become the norm, 
the methods may be expected to become more widely 
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understood and applied. It is not however to be expected, 
even in the remote future, that all conflicts can be fully 
resolved and it is appropriate to consider also strategies of 
amelioration.
5.4  Attitudes
It has been proposed here that economics is very impor-
tant for issues of conflict of interest. The paper has, without 
being prescriptive, indicated some features that would foster 
a sustainable oikonomia, radically differing from the cur-
rent economy-as-usual. Broad features of such an oikonomia 
include law, justice, critical literacy, tolerance, democracy, 
moderation, cooperation, and technological innovations 
(when not subverted by ‘rebound’ in the form of harmful 
economic growth). All of these broad features exist to some 
extent already and have done so for centuries or millennia. 
They exist in imperfect form, coexisting with opposing fea-
tures in a state of contradiction. The gradual development of 
civilising features was identified in The Civilizing Process 
(Elias 1994), a work which Steven Pinker (2011) acknowl-
edges (p xxiv and pp 59–61) as influencing his own work on 
the (per-capita) decline of violence. In the present paper, the 
point of view is taken that, notwithstanding the depressing 
diet of daily news, progress towards sustainability is possi-
ble. It is shown how the conservative nature of mainstream 
economic discourse is a major obstacle to the needed change 
of attitude. This change is from acceptance of economy-
as-usual as natural and inevitable to persistent attention to 
the realities of environment change. It is a change to a will 
to discover what new directions towards a sustainable cul-
ture are possible, and to a will to make appropriate changes. 
Some suggestions—redefining work, basic income, asset and 
income limits—are made which indicate the kind of deep 
change required.
Deep changes such as these can only occur in parallel 
with deep changes of individual and collective attitudes to 
what is important and desirable, that is, deep changes of 
human values. At present, economy-as-usual, especially its 
commitment to growth and to a kind of primacy of property 
over people, represents deeply embedded values. The val-
ues of economy-as-usual have served to make possible an 
unprecedented level of consumption by a significant fraction 
of humanity but planetary boundaries have been reached. 
For this practical reason—quite apart from any moral res-
ervations—economy-as-usual has run its historic course. 
Works and organisations that advocate value changes com-
patible with the necessary kind of economy change include 
The Center for Nonviolent Communication (Center for Non-
violent Communication 2017), The Co-operative College 
(Co-operative College 2017), Common Values (Bok 1995), 
Enough is Enough (Dietz and O’Neill 2013). The circle of 
solidarity of many individuals is expanding, to other humans 
and to life on earth, but the task ahead is immense.
This paper started from the remarkable and rapid changes 
underway in planet earth’s environmental system. The living 
and non-living parts of this unitary system are all affected. 
Fluctuations of various kinds and magnitudes and speeds 
have been a feature of the earth’s history since its begin-
ning. The current changes are so great and fast that talk of 
a sixth mass species extinction (Hance 2015) is warranted. 
The political response, by power elites and other people as 
well, is wholly inadequate in relation to the enormous chal-
lenge. An important aspect of this failure is the theory and 
the practice of economics. The language in which economic 
matters are discussed is highly influential, affecting what 
is considered practical and what impractical. Current eco-
nomic discourse (in economic research, teaching, advice to 
elites, and dissemination to the public) projects a complex 
multi-dimensional reality onto a one-dimensional numerical 
scale, the monetary measure of selected activities. Unre-
flective faith in this linear scale allows growth to become 
a fetish, something by which the well-being of the culture 
as a whole is judged. Humanity has invented and climbed 
aboard a fast machine without first learning how to con-
trol it. The machine, and we with it are in an unstable state 
and we do not understand that further acceleration makes 
matters worse. Notwithstanding the blinkered view of most 
economic experts, elites and other people, radical economic 
change will occur - for better or worse. Some broad-brush 
indications are here given of changes that might mitigate the 
current mass extinction, restore a tolerable degree of stabil-
ity and improve human comfort and joy.
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